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作者：Hou, Dongshuang; Sun, Hao; Sun, Panfei; Driessen, Theo
作者单位：Northwestern Polytechnical University; University of Twente
摘要：The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contri...
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作者：Bachi, Benjamin; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of London; University College London
摘要：We analyze a model of two-attribute competition for a decision maker who follows a non-compensatory choice procedure that only responds to ordinal rankings along the two dimensions. The decision maker has an outside option that functions as a default alternative. In the absence of a dominant alternative, the decision maker may stick to the default even if it is dominated capturing the phenomenon of choice procrastination in the presence of difficult choices. We show that the prevalence of diff...
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作者：Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：University of Basque Country; University of Nottingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous 'disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in d...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this to be the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmon...
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作者：Hillenbrand, Adrian; Winter, Fabian
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：There is ample evidence that the number of players can have an important impact on the cooperation and coordination behavior of people facing social dilemmas. With extremely few exceptions, the literature on cooperation assumes common knowledge about who is a player and how many players are involved in a certain situation. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is overly restrictive, and not even very common in real-world cooperation problems. We show theoretically and experimentally tha...
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作者：Li, Zifan; Tewari, Ambuj
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Fictitious play is a simple and widely studied adaptive heuristic for playing repeated games. It is well known that fictitious play fails to be Hannan consistent. Several variants of fictitious play including regret matching, generalized regret matching and smooth fictitious play, are known to be Hannan consistent. In this note, we consider sampled fictitious play: at each round, the player samples past times and plays the best response to previous moves of other players at the sampled time po...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Peretz, Ron
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulti...
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作者：Cheung, Man-Wah; Lahkar, Ratul
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Udaipur (IIMU)
摘要：This paper studies large population (nonatomic) potential games with continuous strategy sets. We define such games as population games in which the payoff function is equal to the gradient of a real-valued function called the potential function. The Cournot competition model with continuous player set and continuous strategy set is our main example and is analyzed in detail. For general potential games, we establish that maximizers of potential functions are Nash equilibria. For a particular ...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene; He, Simin; Huang, Jia-Ping
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shenzhen University
摘要：When a polluted river passes through several different regions, a challenging question is how should the costs for cleaning the river be shared among the regions. Following Ni and Wang (2007) and Dong et al. (2012), we first show that the Upstream Equal Sharing method and the Downstream Equal Sharing method coincide with the conjunctive permission value (van den Brink and Gilles, 1996) of an associated game with a permission structure, which is obtained as the Shapley value of an associated re...
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作者：Cardella, Eric; Depew, Briggs
作者单位：Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：The ratchet effect is a phenomenon where workers strategically restrict their output because they anticipate high levels of productivity will be met with increased expectations in the future. Using a real-effort work task and a piece-rate incentive scheme, we investigate the presence of the ratchet effect using two different methods for evaluating worker productivity: (i) when productivity is evaluated individually, and (ii) when productivity is evaluated collectively among a group of workers....
