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作者：Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Simple games are abstract representations of voting systems and other group-decision procedures. A stable set-or von Neumann-Morgenstern solution-o f a simple game represents a standard of behavior that satisfies certain internal and external stability properties. Compound simple games are built out of component games, which are, in turn, players of a quotient game. I describe a method to construct fair or symmetry-preserving stable sets of compound simple games from fair stable sets of their ...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Goltsman, Maria; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Michigan State University
摘要：We consider a persuasion game where the decision-maker relies on a panel of biased experts. An expert's preference is parameterized by his ideal action, or agenda. Common intuition suggests that more information is revealed if the panel includes experts with opposed agendas, because such experts will undo each other's attempts to conceal unfavorable information. In contrast, we show that recruiting experts with diverse agendas is optimal only if the correlation between the experts' types-i.e.,...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Ostling, Robert; Wengstrom, Erik
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University; Lund University
摘要：This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to rec...
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作者：Gee, Laura K.; Schreck, Michael J.
作者单位：Tufts University; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：A popular fundraising tool is donation matching, where every dollar is matched by a third party. But field experiments find that matching doesn't always increase donations. Individuals may believe that peers will exhaust the matching funds, so their donation isn't pivotal. We develop a theory of how beliefs about peers' donations affect one's likelihood of donation. We test our theory using novel threshold match treatments in field and laboratory experiments. One threshold match treatment more...
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作者：Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：We study the effects of communication content and its interaction with reputation on the choice of transaction partners in markets with moral hazard. We find that buyers' choices of sellers are influenced by prices and reputation information as well as by sellers' messages: buyers prefer sellers who make specific promises. If specific promises are infeasible, buyers prefer sellers whose arguments reduce the social distance. These observations do not depend on the availability of reputation inf...
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作者：Cumbul, Eray; Virag, Gabor
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University; University of Toronto
摘要：In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of non-equivalent Bertrand equilibria on a wide range of parameter values when the number of firms (n) is more than two and n* is an element of [2, n - 1] firms are active. In each such equilibrium, the firms th...
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作者：Han, Lining; Juarez, Ruben
作者单位：Wuhan University; University of Hawaii System
摘要：We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and the planner optimally selects a subset of them to assist in the transmission of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfectly competitive equilibrium in which intermediaries selected by the planner collect no fees. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and...
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作者：Iskakov, M.; Iskakov, A.; d'Aspremont, C.
作者单位：V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：A non-cooperative solution, the Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (EinSS), is defined as an extension of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and is meant to solve games where players are cautious, i.e., looking for secure positions and avoiding threats. This concept abstracts and unifies ad hoc solutions already formulated in various applied economic games that have been discussed extensively in the literature. A general existence theorem is provided and then applied to the price-setting g...
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作者：Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：We consider how to assign heterogenous objects to agents and determine their payments. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. We focus on the following cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and if objects are equally priced, agents prefer a higher-ranked object to a lower-ranked object, or (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and if objects are equally priced, agents prefer an object in...
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作者：Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We consider mechanisms that provide the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique G-mechanism that satisfies some natural conditions of fairness and convenience. Next we define time and price complexity for any G-mechanism as (respectively) the time required to exchange i for j, and the information needed to determine the exchange ratio (each for the worst pair ij). If the numb...
