On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khan, M. Ali; Zhang, Yongchao
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 289-304
• 关键词: Bayesian games; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Correlated information; atomless independent supplement; Radner-Rosenthal (RR) example

摘要

This paper rehabilitates a program initiated in Aumann (1974) by contributing a result to the theory of finite-player Bayesian games in environments that explicitly include correlated information. An equivalence theorem offers conditions under which the set of mixed-strategy equilibrium payoffs in a classical finite-action game of complete information coincides with the set of objective pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) expected payoffs in an affiliated Bayesian game with type-independent payoffs. This result is motivated for a non-specialist reader by several examples. An Appendix devoted to an intuitive discussion of the so-called 'Lebesgue extension' is added to make the paper self-contained. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.