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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Goldberg, David A.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; Cornell University
摘要：We present a model of repeated games in large two-sided networks between clients and agents in the presence of third-party observability networks via which clients share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks networks in which each agent cooperates with every client that is connected to her. To this end, we show that: [1] an agent a's incentives to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood-a subnetwork tha...
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作者：Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and reanalyses how risk taking varies with relative position and inequality. Individuals with low initial wealth, about to participate in a tournament with richer opponents, may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both consumption and tournament rewards. It is shown that this risk taking decreases in the inequality of initial endowments, but in contrast it increases in the inequality of tournament rewards. (C) 201...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.; Tarraso, Jorge
作者单位：University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Psychophysics studies suggest that our perception of time is different from the objective passage of time. Economics research emphasizes that the value of a reward depends on the delay involved. In this paper, we combine both strands and estimate time perception and time discounting functions at the individual level in an incentivized controlled laboratory environment. We find a negative and statistically significant correlation between time perception and time discounting: subjects who overes...
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作者：Rehbeck, John
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This note studies whether any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium of a game. This note shows that if strategy spaces are metric spaces containing infinitely many points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a separable game. If the strategy spaces are additionally subsets of Euclidean space with infinitely many cluster points, then any set of finitely supported mixed str...
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作者：Blume, Andreas
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper explores higher-order uncertainty about message availability in communication games with perfectly aligned preferences. It can be impossible to achieve ex post efficiency in equilibrium even when it is mutual knowledge that the size of the set of available messages would be sufficient to convey all payoff-relevant information. There are equilibria that achieve ex post efficiency whenever a rich language condition is satisfied: the set of available messages is large relative to the s...
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作者：Celen, Bogachan; Ozgur, Onur
摘要：Final-offer arbitration (FOA) is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism, where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties. We build an equilibrium model of FOA with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues: the role of FOA in incentivizing negotiated settlements, the convergence of final offers, and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion. We show that increase in arbit...
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作者：Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Tsay, Min-Hung; Yeh, Chun-Hsien
作者单位：National Cheng Kung University; National Chung Cheng University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We investigate the nucleolus from both axiomatic and strategic perspectives in the nested cost-sharing problem in which the cost of a public facility has to be shared among agents having different needs for it. We adopt a Right-endpoint Subtraction (RS) formulation, which underlies these two properties: RS bilateral consistency and RS converse consistency. As we show, the nucleolus is the only RS bilaterally consistent (or RS conversely consistent) rule satisfying equal treatment of equals and...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Repeated communication in networks is often considered to impose large information requirements on individuals, and for that reason, the literature has resorted to use heuristics, such as DeGroot's, to compute how individuals update beliefs. In this paper we propose a new heuristic which we term the Bayesian Peer Influence (BPI) heuristic. The BPI accords with Bayesian updating for all (conditionally) independent information structures. More generally, the BPI can be used to analyze the effect...
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作者：Zhang, Huanren
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：I use an evolutionary game to investigate how the level of noise influences cooperation and efficiency in a dynamic setting. Players choose strategies to play indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas; the strategies are represented by finite automata, and complexity costs are imposed. Players update their strategies based on the successfulness of the strategies. Using both theoretical analysis and computational experiments, I show that the presence of noise dramatically changes the system dyn...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I consider static, incomplete information games where players may not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act as if expected utility for uncertainty about types. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
