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作者：Margaria, Chiara; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Boston University; University of Bonn
摘要：We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders' private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be approximated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In particular, there are equilibria in which the receiver makes perfectly informed decisions in almost every period, even...
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作者：Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Monash University; University of Southampton; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We develop a product-differentiated model where the product space is a network defined as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substitutability (edges). We also locate consumers into this network, so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her ideal variety. We show that there exists a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium where prices are determined by both the firms' sign-alternating Bonacich centralities and the average willingness to pay across consumers. We al...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor V.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Manchester
摘要：The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kurz, Sascha; Maaser, Nicola; Napel, Stefan
作者单位：University of Bayreuth; University of Bremen; University of Bayreuth
摘要：When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for 'fair representation' of all bottom-tier voters in the top-tier decision making body, but rests on the restrictive assumption of independent binary decisions. We consider intervals of alternatives with single-peaked preferences in...
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作者：Fehr, Dietmar
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Increasing inequality is commonly associated with social unrest and conflict between social classes. This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment to study the implications of greater inequality on the tendency to burn others' income. The experiment considers an environment where higher earnings in a real-effort task are typically associated with higher effort and varies how fair and transparent this relationship is. The findings indicate that greater inequality does not lead to mo...
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作者：Xiao, Jun
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper studies a complete-information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of different sizes or bargaining strengths. The bargaining order is determined endogenously. With a finite horizon, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, in which the buyer purchases in order of increasing size from the smallest to the largest. With an infinite horizon, if the sellers have sufficiently different sizes, there is a unique equilibrium outcome, which has the same bargaini...
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作者：Chen, Chun-Ting; Huang, Chen-Ying; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
作者单位：National Taiwan University
摘要：We study the reasoning process in an environment where final choices are well understood and the associated theory is procedural by introducing two-person beauty contest games played spatially on two-dimensional grid maps. Players choose locations and are rewarded by hitting targets dependent on opponents' choice locations. By tracking subjects' eye movements (lookups), we infer their reasoning process and classify subjects into various levels. More than a half of the subjects' classifications...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Lim, Wooyoung; Neary, Philip; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Kyoto University
摘要：When coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents' non-best response behavior, we show that the Egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm. Without intentional bias, a new solution, the Logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm. These results contrast with results under non-payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior, where it has previously been shown that the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Nash barg...
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作者：Grosskopf, Brit; Rentschler, Lucas; Sarin, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Exeter; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：In common-value auctions bidders have access to public information, and may also hold private information prior to choosing their bids. The literature has predominately focused on the case in which bidders are ex-ante symmetric and privately informed, and finds that aggressive bidding such that payoffs are negative is common (the winner's curse). In practice, bidders often only have access to public information, and use this information to form (possibly differing) beliefs. In addition, a bidd...
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作者：Kariv, Shachar; Kotowski, Maciej H.; Leister, C. Matthew
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University; Monash University
摘要：This paper studies a model of intermediated exchange with liquidity-constrained traders. Intermediaries are embedded in a trading network and their financial capacities are private information. We characterize our model's monotone, pure-strategy equilibrium. Agents earn positive intermediation rents in equilibrium. An experimental investigation supports the model's baseline predictions concerning agents' strategies, price dynamics, and the division of surplus. While private financial constrain...
