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作者：Schulman, Leonard J.; Vazirani, Umesh V.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider multiplayer games in which the players fall in two teams of size k, with payoffs equal within, and of opposite sign across, the two teams. In the classical case of k = 1, such zero-sum games possess a unique value, independent of order of play. However, this fails for all k> 1; we can measure this failure by a duality gap, which quantifies the benefit of being the team to commit last to its strategy. We show that the gap equals 2(1 21 k) for m = 2 and 2(1 m(-(1-0(1))k)) for m > 2, ...
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作者：Wang, Siyu; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Missouri State University; George Mason University
摘要：Research has shown that natural language communication is more effective than intention signaling in promoting coordination. Our paper studies the reasons behind this finding. We hypothesize that, when communicating with natural language, people use and respond to both intentions and attitudes, with attitude indicating the strength of a message sender's desire to have her message followed. We test our hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We find that: (i) free-form messages incl...
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作者：Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Vienna
摘要：We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a dark side, that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Brill, Markus
作者单位：Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO); CSIRO Data61; University of New South Wales Sydney; Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We study social decision schemes (SDSs), i.e., functions that map a collection of individual preferences over alternatives to a lottery over the alternatives. Depending on how preferences over alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries, there are varying degrees of efficiency and strategyproofness. In this paper, we consider four such preference extensions: stochastic dominance (SD), a strengthening of SD based on pairwise comparisons (PC), a weakening of SD called bilinear domina...
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作者：Clark, Derek J.; Nilssen, Tore
作者单位：UiT The Arctic University of Tromso; University of Oslo
摘要：We investigate a model of a series of contests in which a contestant's past and present success gives a head start over a rival in the future. How this advantage from winning affects contestants' efforts, whether the laggard gives up or keeps on fighting, and how the head start develops over time, are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadva...
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作者：Ghosal, Sayantan; Tonin, Simone
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Durham University
摘要：In this paper, we extend the noncooperative analysis of multilateral oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and trader types where exchange is modelled using a strategic market game with commodity money and trading posts. We prove the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its convergence to a Walras equilibrium when the economy is replicated. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
作者单位：Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS; Moscow Institute of Physics & Technology
摘要：Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain facilities. All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a trimness condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Rome Tor Vergata; IPAG Business School
摘要：We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclusive competition is at the center stage of recent analyses of markets with private information. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents' exogenous pri...
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence
摘要：We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only i...
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作者：Chen, Xi; Diakonikolas, Ilias; Paparas, Dimitris; Sun, Xiaorui; Yannakakis, Mihalis
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer's values for the items are independent. We show that the problem of computing a revenue optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial time for distributions of support size 2, and its decision version is NP-complete for distributions of support size 3. We also show that the problem remains NP-complete for the case of identica...
