Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agranov, Marina; Eraslan, Hulya; Tergiman, Chloe
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220327
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 229-258
• 关键词: stochastic-model; COMMUNICATION; DELAYS; games

摘要

In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high. Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can arise under majority rule. Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules. We also find large point prediction deviations under the majority rule. We show these deviations can be explained by higher-than-predicted egalitarian sharing and a lower risk of being excluded from future agreements.