Limited Strategic Thinking and the Cursed Match

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bochet, Olivier; Magnani, Jacopo
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210344
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 321-344
• 关键词: winners curse; INFORMATION; beliefs; auctions; explain; CHOICE; games

摘要

In vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news. We experimentally investigate whether individuals anticipate the acceptance curse in such an environment. We test the effect of an exogenous change in reservation values, making some types more selective and inducing significant changes in the posterior distribution of match qualities. Consistent with limited strategic sophistication, subjects don't respond to this manipulation. Through additional investigation and structural estimations, we suggest a mechanism explaining the lack of subjects' response: out-of-equilibrium beliefs are quantitatively more important than limited conditional thinking. ( JEL C78, C91, D82) )