Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laferriere, Vincent; Montez, Joao; Roux, Catherine; Thoni, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; University of Lausanne; University of Basel
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210377
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 39-61
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; multimarket contact; behavioral spillovers; mutual forbearance; Cognitive load; PRISONERS; RULE; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; CONDUCT

摘要

We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely. ( JEL C72, C73, C92, D91 )