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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Lin, Charles
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Some individuals vote because they are motivated by a civic duty to do so, whereas others may vote because they wish to appear prosocial to others. This paper proposes a simple framework that captures these motivations, and provides results consistent with findings on turnout, e.g., that turnout is responsive to the expected closeness and importance of an election, to the observability of one's choice to vote, and to social rewards and punishments associated with voting. We study various exten...
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作者：Gale, Ian; O'Brien, Daniel P.
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which c...
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作者：Schummer, James; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle varian...
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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general pro...
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作者：Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfied together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability...
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作者：Bardhan, Pranab; Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We study a competitive theory of middlemen with brand-name reputations necessary to overcome product quality moral hazard problems. Agents with heterogeneous abilities sort into different sectors and occupations. Middleman margins do not equalize across sectors if production of different goods are differentially prone to moral hazard, generating endogenous mobility barriers. We embed the model in a setting of North-South trade, and explore the distributive implications of trade liberalization....
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Duke University; Stanford University
摘要：We study trust, reciprocity, and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings,...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher T.; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：Columbia University; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Incomplete product availability is an important feature of many markets, and ignoring changes in availability may bias demand estimates. We study a new dataset from a wireless inventory system on vending machines to track product availability every four hours. The data allow us to account for product availability when estimating demand, and provide valuable variation for identifying substitution patterns when products stock out. We develop a procedure that allows for changes in product availab...
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作者：De Loecker, Jan
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Learning by exporting refers to the mechanism whereby a firm's performance improves after entering export markets. This mechanism is often mentioned in policy documents, but many econometric studies have not found corroborating evidence. I show that the econometric methods rely on an assumption that productivity evolves exogenously. I show how to accommodate endogenous productivity processes, such as learning by exporting. I discuss the bias introduced by ignoring such a process, and show that...
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作者：Coles, Peter; Kushnir, Alexey; Niederle, Muriel
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Zurich; Stanford University
摘要：Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and ...
