Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.120
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 120-141
• 关键词: Core; MARKETS; INFORMATION; collusion; DESIGN

摘要

I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfied together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability can only be satisfied when there is one agent on the short side of the market, as in auctions. Which stability is appropriate depends on when agents can block.