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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Bajari, Patrick
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game...
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作者：Bedre-Defolie, Oezlem; Calvano, Emilio
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial interchange fees to cardholders' banks on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, oversubsidizing card usage and overtaxing merchants. We show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage), whereas merchants make only one (membership). In general, we contr...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：University of Essex; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions ge...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Coey, Dominic; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alt...
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作者：Ghosh, Sambuddha; Tripathi, Vinayak
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Our model considers a majority election between two candidates-an ideologue committed to a fixed policy and an idealist who implements the ex post choice of the majority. Voters are aware that their individual rankings of policies may change after the election according to common or idiosyncratic shocks. We show that in equilibrium the ideologue often beats the idealist, even when this choice hurts all voters. Inefficiency arises both for sincere and for strategic voters; we also show that it ...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Prina, Silvia; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Boston University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; New York University
摘要：Theories based on partial equilibrium reasoning alone cannot explain the widespread negative cross-sectional correlation between parental wages and fertility, without restrictive assumptions on preferences and childcare costs. We argue that incorporating a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of returns to human capital can help explain observed empirical patterns. Other by-products of this theory include explanations for intergenerational mobility without stochastic shocks, connections betwee...
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作者：Holmes, Thomas J.; Levine, David K.; Schmitz, James A., Jr.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Arrow (1962) argued that since a monopoly restricts output relative to a competitive industry, it would be less willing to pay a fixed cost to adopt a new technology. We develop a new theory of why a monopolistic industry innovates less. Firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, upon adoption of technology, firms must temporarily reduce output. We call such problems switchover disruptions. A cost of adoption, then, is the forgone rents on the sales of lost...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to cheat their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network fe...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze the relation between religious beliefs, religious participation, and social cooperation. We focus on religions that instill beliefs about the connection between rewards and punishments and social behavior. We show how religious organizations arise endogenously, and identify a spiritual as well as a material payoff for being religious. We show that religious groups that are more demanding in their rituals are smaller, more cohesive, and are composed of individuals with more extreme b...
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作者：Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swarthmore College; Columbia University
摘要：Economists are increasingly interested in how group membership affects individual behavior. The standard method assigns individuals to minimal groups, i.e. arbitrary labels, in a lab. But real groups often involve social interactions leading to social ties between group members. Our experiments compare randomly assigned minimal groups to randomly assigned groups involving real social interactions. While adding social ties leads to qualitatively similar, although stronger, in-group favoritism i...
