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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Lee, Frances Zhiyun Xu
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition cost is small, these two effe...
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作者：Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies multiprize contests in which players' costs need not be strictly increasing in their performance. Such costs accommodate various types of asymmetries, including head starts. Head starts capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly-dominated strategies, and apply it to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts. A comparison to the st...
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作者：Ortalo-Magne, Francois; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We study the equilibrium properties of an overlapping-generation economy where agents choose where to locate and how much housing to own, and city residents vote on the number of new building permits every period. Undersupply of housing persists in equilibrium under conditions we characterize. City residents invest in housing because they expect their investment to be protected by a majority opposed to urban growth. They vote against growth because they have invested in local housing. This vic...
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作者：Hendel, Igal; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing of storable goods. We show that storability imposes novel constraints on a monopolist's ability to extract surplus. We then show that the attempt to relax these constraints can generate cyclical patterns in pricing and sales, even when consumers are homogeneous. Thus, the model provides a novel explanation for sales that does not rely on discriminating heterogeneous consumers. Enriching the model to allow for buyer heterogeneity in storage techn...
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作者：Iozzi, Alberto; Valletti, Tommaso
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of London; University of London School Oriental & African Studies (SOAS); Imperial College London
摘要：We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic impact on the supplier's outside options and, therefore, on input prices and welfare. We revisit the countervailing buyer power hypothesis and obtain results in stark contrast with previous findings, de...
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作者：Felgenhauer, Mike; Schulte, Elisabeth
作者单位：University of Plymouth; Philipps University Marburg
摘要：We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is imp...
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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
摘要：The traditional literature on kidney exchange assumes that all components of the exchange must occur simultaneously. Unfortunately, the number of operating rooms required for concurrent surgeries poses a significant constraint on the beneficial exchanges that may be attained. The basic insight of this paper is that incentive compatibility does not require simultaneous exchange; rather, it requires that organ donation occurs no later than the associated organ receipt. Using sequential exchanges...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Selden, Larry; Wei, Xiao
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Risk free asset demand in the classic portfolio problem is shown to decrease with income if and only if the consumer's uncertainty preferences over assets satisfy the preference condition that the risk free asset is more readily substituted for the risky asset as the quantity of the latter increases. In this case, the risky asset is said to be urgently needed following the terminology of the classic certainty analysis of Johnson (1913). The urgently needed property tends to be more readily sat...
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作者：Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：We study mechanisms for selecting up to m out of n projects. Project managers' private information on quality is elicited through transfers. Under limited liability, the optimal mechanism selects projects that maximize some function of the project's observable and reported characteristics. When all reported qualities exceed their own project-specific thresholds, the selected set only depends on observable characteristics, not reported qualities. Each threshold is related to (i) the outside opt...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Haifa; University of Haifa
摘要：We introduce an ordinal model of efficiency measurement. Our primitive is a notion of efficiency that is comparative, but not cardinal or absolute. In this framework, we postulate axioms that an ordinal efficiency measure should satisfy. Primary among these are choice consistency and planning consistency, which guide the measurement of efficiency in a firm with access to multiple technologies. Other axioms include scale invariance, strong monotonicity, and a continuity condition. These axioms ...
