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作者：Eswaran, Mukesh; Neary, Hugh M.
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We model the emergence of an innate, biological sense of property rights where resource scarcity and output contestability reign. Preferences evolve such that, in evolutionarily stable equilibrium, an object is valued more by an individual who possesses it, or has produced it, than if he is neither possessor nor producer. In a distributional contest for the object, the possessor/producer will devote more effort to retaining it than an interloper will to expropriating it. Asymmetry in preferenc...
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作者：Bolle, Friedel; Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Zizzo, Daniel John
作者单位：European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder; University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggressi...
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作者：Kurino, Morimitsu
摘要：Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a newcomer in the beginning and then becomes an existing tenant. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship ...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bourles, Renaud; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact ...
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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is frame-dependent, and firms use costless marketing messages to influence the consumer's frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the behavioral industrial organization literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property....
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作者：Smith, Alec; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Camerer, Colin F.; Rangel, Antonio
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We investigate the feasibility of inferring the choices people would make (if given the opportunity) based on their neural responses to the pertinent prospects when they are not engaged in actual decision making. The ability to make such inferences is of potential value when choice data are unavailable, or limited in ways that render standard methods of estimating choice mappings problematic. We formulate prediction models relating choices to nonchoice neural responses, and use them to predict...
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作者：Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When data is scarce, it is difficult to screen the opinions of informed and uninformed experts. In spite of this difficulty it is possible to deliver incentives for informed experts to honestly reveal their views, and for uninformed experts to do no harm to a principal in the sense that uninformed experts report the view the principal held originally (i.e., without the expert's report). This follows even if there is only a single data point to evaluate the expert's opinions and the expert's pr...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：In several common-value environments (e. g., auctions or elections), players should make informational inferences from opponents' strategies under certain hypothetical events (e. g., winning the auction or being pivotal). We design a voting experiment that identifies whether subjects make these inferences and distinguishes between hypothetical thinking and information extraction. Depending on feedback, between 50 and 80 percent of subjects behave nonoptimally. More importantly, these mistakes ...
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作者：van der Weele, Joel J.; Kulisa, Julija; Kosfeld, Michael; Friebel, Guido
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior.
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作者：Campbell, Arthur; Ederer, Florian; Spinnewijn, Johannes
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study two sources of delay in teams: freeriding and lack of communication. Partners contribute to the value of a common project, but have private information about the success of their own efforts. When the deadline is far away, unsuccessful partners freeride on each others' efforts. When the deadline draws close, successful partners stop revealing their success to maintain their partners' motivation. We derive comparative statics results for common team performance measures and find that t...
