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作者：Seim, Katja; Viard, V. Brian
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We examine how structural changes in the mobile telecommunications industry between 1996, when local markets were duopolies, and 1998, when varying degrees of regulated entry had occurred, affected firms' product offerings and nonlinear pricing strategies. We relate firms' digital technology adoption and the characteristics of their calling plan menus to the amount of entry in local markets. We find that entry induces firms to offer larger menus with more evenly spread plans, both directly and...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies a simple model of experimentation and innovation. Our analysis suggests that patents improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and efficient ex post transfer of knowledge. Each firm receives a signal on the success probability of a project and decides when to experiment. Successes can be copied. First, we assume that signal qualities are the same. Symmetric equilibria involve delayed and staggered experimentation, whereas the optimal allocation...
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作者：Matsa, David A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper examines whether debt financing can undermine a supermarket firm's incentive to provide product quality In the supermarket industry, product availability is an important measure of a retailer's quality. Using US consumer price index microdata to track inventory shortfalls, I find that taking on high financial leverage increases shortfalls. Highly leveraged firms appear to be degrading their products' quality in order to preserve current cash flow for debt service. Although reducing ...
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作者：Coffman, Lucas C.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances...
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作者：Arieli, Amos; Ben-Ami, Yaniv; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：Eye tracking is used to investigate the procedures that participants employ in choosing between two lotteries. Eye movement patterns in problems where the deliberation process is clearly identified are used to substantiate an interpretation of the results. The data provide little support for the hypothesis that decision makers rely exclusively upon an expected utility type of calculation. Instead eye patterns indicate that decision makers often compare prizes and probabilities separately. This...
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作者：Kosfeld, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization, we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that the award increases performance by about 12 percent on ave...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a dating process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium g...
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作者：Fershtman, Chaim; Gneezy, Uri; Hoffman, Moshe
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：A taboo is an unthinkable action. Even the thought of violating a taboo triggers a punishment. We consider a model in which taboos are part of the definition of one's identity. Deliberating over breaking the taboo changes the individual's choice set, and provides information on possible private benefits. The strength of the taboo is determined by the number of individuals that obey it. We analyze the relationship between social heterogeneity and taboos' strength. We then examine societies in w...
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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Giroux, Gaston; Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter and reveal information to each other over time. We provide an explicit solution for the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of posterior beliefs. We also show that convergence of the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs to a common posterior is exponential and that the rate of convergence does not depend on the size of the groups of agents that meet. The rate of convergence is mere...
