Strategic Tournaments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tel Aviv University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.31
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 31-54
• 关键词: evolution; game

摘要

A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behavior.