Assignment of Arrival Slots

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schummer, James; Vohra, Rakesh V.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.164
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 164-185
• 关键词: strategy-proof; allocation

摘要

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999) and Papai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots.