Trust, Reciprocity, and Favors in Cooperative Relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Bagwell, Kyle
• 署名单位: Duke University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.2.213
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 213-259
• 关键词: starting small; collusion

摘要

We study trust, reciprocity, and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings, an infrequent and symmetric punishment sustains greater cooperation. A honeymoon period followed by favor-exchange or symmetric punishment can also offer scope for improvement.