Affirmative Action: One Size Does Not Fit All

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, Kala; Tarasov, Alexander
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; National Bureau of Economic Research; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140200
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 215-252
• 关键词: asymmetric contests; task-performance; head starts; incentives; admissions

摘要

This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working in favor of them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the United States), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.