Exchange Efficiency with Weak Ownership Rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bar-Gill, Oren; Persico, Nicola
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140232
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 230-267
• 关键词: PROPERTY-RIGHTS; LIABILITY RULES; origins; ideas; view

摘要

We show that efficient exchange obtains independently of the degree to which a legal system protects the rights of owners. We study a number of different legal rules, including property rules (strong protection), liability rules (any party can take the owner's asset but must pay a legally determined compensation), and even rules that protect the owner's interests very weakly (liability rules with a very low compensation level). Efficiency is obtained as long as the degree of protection provided by law and by the bargaining protocol is not too inversely correlated with a party's valuation of the asset.