Naked Exclusion with Private Offers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150332
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 174-194
• 关键词: downstream competition; Bilateral contracts; buyers compete; entry; externalities

摘要

We consider a seller's ability to deter potential entrants by offering exclusive contracts to downstream buyers. Previous literature has shown that this can be a profitable strategy if there is a coordination failure on the part of the buyers or if the seller can make discriminatory divide-and-conquer offers. This literature assumes that all offers are public. We show that if buyers cannot observe each other's offers and have passive or wary out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the divide-and-conquer exclusion strategy fails. Equilibria in which the incumbent obtains exclusion due to a coordination failure, on the other hand, exist for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs.