Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gautier, Pieter A.; Holzner, Christian L.
• 署名单位: Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160088
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 245-282
• 关键词: Competing auctions; networks; workers; frictions; sellers; prices; COSTS

摘要

We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency.