Collective Self-Control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lizzeri, Alessandro; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: New York University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150325
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 213-244
• 关键词: government policy; ECONOMICS; COMPETITION; preference; temptation; welfare; CHOICE

摘要

Behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only distortion is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization or laissez-faire. Second, introducing collective action only on consumption decisions yields no commitment. Last, individuals' relative preferences for commitment may reverse depending on whether future consumption decisions are centralized or not.