Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baranov, Oleg; Aperjis, Christina; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Morrill, Thayer
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160087
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-27
• 关键词: price vickrey auctions; Commodities; multiple; objects

摘要

For procuring from sellers with decreasing returns, there are known efficient dynamic auction formats. In this paper, we design an efficient dynamic procurement auction for the case where goods are homogeneous and bidders have increasing returns. Our motivating example is the procurement of vaccines, which often exhibit large fixed costs and small constant marginal costs. The auctioneer names a price and bidders report the interval of quantities that they are willing to sell at that price. The process repeats with successively lower prices, until the efficient outcome is discovered. We demonstrate an equilibrium that is efficient and generates VCG prices.