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作者：Barkley, Aaron
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper investigates the how government outsourcing affects efficiency and expenditures by considering how outsourcing decisions are determined along two dimensions: (i) cost differences between private firms and government suppliers of public goods and (ii) dynamics arising from cost complementarities and capacity constraints. I formulate and estimate a dynamic model of government outsourcing using project-level data from the dredging industry. Model estimates indicate substantial cost sav...
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作者：Kawai, K. E., I; Toyama, Yuta; Watanabe, Yasutora
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Waseda University; University of Tokyo
摘要：We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of preferences in elections. Under voluntary voting, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show identification of the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 US presidential election data, we find that young, low-income, less-educated, an...
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作者：Thomas, Caroline D.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper considers a two-player game of strategic experimentation with competition. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually chooses between her private, risky arm and a common, safe arm. Each agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, the common arm can only be activated by one agent at a time. This congestion creates negative payoff externalities. Our main finding is that congestion gives rise to new strategic considerations: players perceive a strateg...
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作者：Angrisani, Marco; Guarino, Antonio; Jehiel, Philippe; Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their beliefs about the value of a good after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision-making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the p...
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作者：Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
摘要：The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Ansco...
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作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Luca, Michael; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver ac...
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作者：Araujo, Felipe A.; Wang, Stephanie W.; Wilson, Alistair J.
作者单位：Lehigh University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine a common value dynamic matching environment where adverse selection accrues slowly over time. Theoretical best responses are therefore time varying, and the prior experimental literature suggests that sequential environments might lead to greater understanding of adverse selection in this dynamic setting. However, while a sophisticated minority in our experiment do condition on time and are close to a best response, the majority use a stationary response, even after extended experie...
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作者：Engl, Florian; Riedl, Arno; Weber, Roberto
作者单位：University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Tilburg University; Maastricht University; University of Zurich
摘要：Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about...
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作者：Tsur, Matan
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors a share of the revenues. The revenue of each project is determined ex post through bargaining with a buyer of the output. Thus, the choice of security affects the feasible payoffs of the bargaining game. We characterize the securities that achieve the firm's maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In a large class of sec...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equili...
