Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engl, Florian; Riedl, Arno; Weber, Roberto
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Tilburg University; Maastricht University; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180336
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 261-299
• 关键词: public-goods; social norms; multiple games; incentives; culture; ENFORCEMENT; PUNISHMENT; motivation; CHOICE; POLICY

摘要

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.