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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Temnyalov, Emil; Turner, John L.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Technology Sydney; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In liability lawsuits (e.g., patent infringement), a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant, and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics of monopoly and equilibrium contracts in settings where this leverage effect is a substantial source of value for insurance. Our results show that under adverse selection, a monopolist offers at most...
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作者：Wittwer, Milena
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In most financial markets, securities are traded in isolation. Such a disconnected market design can be inefficient if agents trade more than one security. I assess welfare effects of connecting markets by allowing orders for one security to depend on prices of other securities. I show that everyone trades identical amounts under both market structures if and only if the clearing prices are perfectly correlated or all are price-takers. Prices in disconnected markets might allow strategic trade...
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作者：Biasi, Barbara; Moser, Petra
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：Copyrights, which establish intellectual property in music, science, and other creative goods, are intended to encourage creativity. Yet, copyrights also raise the cost of accessing existing work-potentially discouraging future innovation. This paper uses an exogenous shift toward weak copyrights (and low access costs) during World War II to examine the potentially adverse effects of copyrights on science. Using two alternative identification strategies, we show that weaker copyrights encourag...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.; Galeotti, Andrea
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Recent developments in social media have morphed the age-old practice of paying influential individuals for product endorsements into a multibillion dollar industry, extending well beyond celebrity sponsorships. We develop a parsimonious model in which influencers trade off the increased revenue they obtain from paid endorsements with the negative impact that these have on their followers' engagement and, therefore, on the price influencers receive from marketers. The model provides testable p...
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作者：Gans, Joshua S.; Goldfarb, Avi; Lederman, Mara
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty highlights the role of voice when individuals confront an unexpected deterioration in quality. Yet, voice has received little attention. To motivate our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of voice as the equilibrium of a relational contract between customers and firms. We use data on 4 million tweets to or about US airlines to study the relationship between quality, voice, and market structure. Voice increases when quality deteriorates. This rela...
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作者：Gaudin, Germain; White, Alexander
作者单位：University of Freiburg; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要：Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role that user access plays on prices, profits, and welfare under both forms of agreement. We characterize this role and show how it potentially overturns standard results saying that proportional fees lead to...
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作者：Jacobs, Joshua A.; Kolb, Aaron M.; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Duke University
摘要：We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member's output is an imperfect signal of his underlying effort, and each member's utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to other members' efforts. Monetary transfers are assumed infeasible. Incentives can be provided only through two channels: expulsion following poor performance and respite following good performance. We derive the steady state distribution of members' continuation utilities for arbitrary values ...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Baranovskyi, Volodymyr; Kolb, Aaron
作者单位：Duke University; University of Rochester; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an element of...
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作者：Allen, Jason; Hortacsu, Ali; Kastl, Jakub
作者单位：Bank of Canada; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要：Using detailed information from the Canadian interbank payments system and liquidity-providing facilities, we find that despite sustained increases in market-rate spreads, the increase in banks' willingness to pay for liquidity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis was short-lived. Our study suggests that high-frequency distress indicators based on demand for liquidity offered by central banks can be complementary, and perhaps even superior, to market-based indicators, especially during times ...
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作者：Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker's ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or...
