Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jin, Ginger Zhe; Luca, Michael; Martin, Daniel
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Harvard University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180217
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 141-173
• 关键词: Stated beliefs; COMPETITION; thinking; transmission; equilibrium; deception; MARKETS; school; play; LAWS

摘要

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.