A Bargaining-Based Model of Security Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsur, Matan
• 署名单位: University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190019
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 443-473
• 关键词: limited-liability; capital structure; debt; equilibrium; CONTRACTS; CHOICE; MARKET

摘要

This paper studies how security design affects project outcomes. Consider a firm that raises capital for multiple projects by offering investors a share of the revenues. The revenue of each project is determined ex post through bargaining with a buyer of the output. Thus, the choice of security affects the feasible payoffs of the bargaining game. We characterize the securities that achieve the firm's maximal equilibrium payoff in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In a large class of securities, the optimal contract is remarkably simple. The firm finances each project separately with defaultable debt. Welfare and empirical implications are discussed.