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作者：Guo, Huiyi; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Iowa
摘要：This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient co...
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作者：Fishman, Arthur; Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：Ariel University; Bar Ilan University; New York University
摘要：The prospect of capital obsolescence inhibits investment. Investors thus become more optimistic when the obsolescence of their capital slows down. We propose a model with no fixed costs of investment, and random technological progress that induces obsolescence of capital in place. Spikes occur precisely when technological progress slows down. Moreover, the more variable the progress, the larger are the spikes. Cross-industry data show that where price of capital declines are more variable, inv...
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作者：Hestermann, Nina; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：University of St Andrews; University of Munich; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study an experimentation problem in a situation where the outcomes depend on the decision-maker's intrinsic ability and on an external variable. We analyze the mistakes made by individuals who hold inaccurate prior beliefs about their ability. Overconfident individuals take too much credit for their successes and excessively blame external factors if they fail. They are too easily dissatisfied with their environment, which leads them to experiment in variable environments and revise their s...
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作者：Lach, Saul; Neeman, Zvika; Schankerman, Mark
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Tel Aviv University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-finan...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Bowen, T. Renee
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experime...
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作者：Song, Minjae
作者单位：The Brattle Group
摘要：In two-sided markets, two groups of agents interact through platforms. Because agents' decision to join a platform is affected by the presence of agents on the other side, their interactions create indirect network externalities and make platforms' strategies different from those of firms in one-sided markets. In this paper, I use a structural model to show that platforms may take a loss on one side of the market to make a profit on the other side and that platform mergers may benefit some age...
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作者：Carbonell-nicolau, Oriol; Llavador, Humberto
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：The steady rise in income and wealth inequality in the last four decades,together with the evolution of a vanishing middle class, has raised concerns about potentially pernicious effects of these trends on social stability and economic growth. This paper evaluates the possibility of designing tax systems aimed at reducing income inequality and bipo-larization. Using two fundamentally different metrics, we provide a unified foundation of tax progressivity whereby, roughly, taxes are progressive...
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作者：Mullin, Wallace P.; Snyder, Christopher M.
作者单位：George Washington University; Dartmouth College
摘要：We propose a simple method, requiring only minimal data, for bounding demand elasticities in growing, homogeneous-product markets. Since growing demand curves cannot cross, shifts in market equilibrium over time can be used to funnel the demand curve into a narrow region, bounding its slope. Our featured application assesses the antitrust remedy in the 1952 DuPont decision, ordering incumbents to license patents for commercial plastics. We bound the demand elasticity significantly below 1 in m...
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作者：Piveteau, Paul
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic structural model of trade in which firms slowly accumulate consumers in foreign markets. Estimating the model using export data from individual firms and a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo estimator, the model predicts lower survival rates for new exporters and estimates low entry costs of exporting-less than half of those estimated in the absence of consumer accumulation. Using simulations and out-of-sample predictions, I show that the introduction of such frict...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Product recall data and information on stock price reactions to recalls are used to estimate the value of reputation in a model in which product quality is not contractible. A recall is the result of a product defect that signals low effort. The recall triggers a reduction in the firm's product price and value, which then both rise steadily until its next defect occurs. We estimate that reputation accounts for 8.3 percent of firm value and that welfare is 26 percent of its first best level. A ...
