Strategic Experimentation with Congestion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thomas, Caroline D.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170187
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1-82
• 关键词: bandit problems; preemption; COMPETITION; index; games

摘要

This paper considers a two-player game of strategic experimentation with competition. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually chooses between her private, risky arm and a common, safe arm. Each agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, the common arm can only be activated by one agent at a time. This congestion creates negative payoff externalities. Our main finding is that congestion gives rise to new strategic considerations: players perceive a strategic option value from occupying the common arm, making it more attractive than in the absence of competition or when switching is irreversible.