Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
• 署名单位: Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180344
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 112-123
• 关键词: separate aggregation; preferences; welfare

摘要

The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.