Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schummer, James; Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180065
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 116-147
• 关键词: school-choice; division

摘要

Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even wizen the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones.