Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dur, Umut; Pathak, Parag A.; Song, Fei; Sonmez, Tayfun
• 署名单位: North Carolina State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180386
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 164-185
• 关键词: School choice; college admissions

摘要

This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism used nationwide for high school assignment starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score, with larger penalties for lower-ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid of the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless remains in use.