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作者：Chowdhury, Prabal Roy; Sengupta, Kunal
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Sydney
摘要：The hold-up problem has given rise to a large and influential literature. We consider a bilateral hold-up problem where bargaining power is asymmetrically distributed among the agents, in particular investing at the efficient level is not individually rational for one of the agents. We demonstrate that in the presence of a rich natural setup-that allows for dynamics in transfers, investments and negotiations-there exist subgame perfect equilibria that achieve asymptotic efficiency. This is tru...
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作者：Kirneva, Margarita; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：All currently known mechanisms that fully implement Majority rule are either infinite (integer games) or rely on off-equilibrium transfers. We propose a finite mechanism with no transfers, called Bloc formation, that achieves this goal in pure and mixed strategies. It increases the set of instances where any agent is pivotal by relying on off-equilibrium lotteries, and thus, incentivizes truth-telling.
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作者：Goldlucke, Susanne; Troger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Mannheim
摘要：We present a class of simple transfer-free rules for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents: agents decide simultaneously whether or not to volunteer; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a volunteer; otherwise, the task is assigned to a non-volunteer. In particular, the rule may ask for multiple volunteers although one agent is sufficient to perform the task. In a setting in which agents care about who performs the task, any multiple-vo...
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作者：Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We study the interaction between self-insurance and market insurance when accident losses are multivalued. We show that self-insurance and market insurance may be complementary when self-insurance expenses do not affect much the probability distribution of large losses and the loading factor is high. This contrasts sharply with the conclusion of Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who establish the substitutability between self-insurance and market insurance when the cost of an accident is single-valued.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper introduces and examines limit-of-all-finite (LOAF) equilibria, defined as strategy profiles obtained as limits of epsilon-equilibria along all discretizations of an infinite game. We establish conditions under which any limit of epsilon-equilibria along one discretization is a LOAF equilibrium, and we show that these conditions are satisfied in many common infinite games, such as Bertrand competition, wars of attrition, and standard auctions. We also identify conditions that ensure ...
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作者：Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology; Nagoya University; University of Osaka
摘要：We study an assignment market where multiple heterogeneous objects are sold to unit-demand agents who have general preferences that account for income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium concepts in such settings, as it demonstrates the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Nevertheless, none of the well-known auction mechanisms that find the MPE in quasilinear settings can identify or even appro...
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作者：Yang, Lily Ling
作者单位：Universitat de les Illes Balears
摘要：We study a persuasion problem in which the receiver has the ability to probabilistically verify the state at a cost. The sender wants to convince the receiver to accept a project, but the receiver is only willing to accept the project when its quality is above a threshold. The optimal disclosure policy strikes a balance between influencing the receiver's decisions to accept and to verify the quality. It is deterministic and involves at most three messages, each consisting of an acceptance reco...
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作者：Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This article identifies sufficient conditions under which a partial construction of sequential equilibrium-characterizing beliefs and behavior for only a subset of the information sets-is sufficient for the existence of a sequential equilibrium that coincides with the partial construction in a suitable way. Illustrative applications are also presented.
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作者：Azarmsa, Ehsan
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：I study the stationary wealth distribution in a dynamic model of financial markets in which investors differ in their levels of investment sophistication. Some investors form beliefs rationally but have access to different information, while others hold incorrect beliefs. For all investor types, the stationary wealth distribution exhibits a thick upper tail, whose thickness depends on the higher moments of portfolio returns relative to the aggregate market. The upper tail of the overall statio...
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作者：Yueshen, Bart Zhou; Zou, Junyuan
作者单位：Singapore Management University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We show in a model of RFQ trading that customers may admit only a few dealers, even when more are available, to induce maximum liquidity supply-less can be more. The number of admitted dealers is pinned down by a competition elasticity, shaped by dealers' cost to respond to RFQs. For example, higher search (operating) costs increase (reduce) admitted dealers. A social planner would mandate even fewer dealers than the market outcome, because customers induce excessive dealer competition. The mo...
