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作者：Lyu, Chen
作者单位：Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University
摘要：A recommendation platform sequentially collects information about a new product revealed from past consumer trials, and uses it to better guide later consumers. Because consumers do not internalize the value of information they bring to others, their incentive for trying out the product can be socially insufficient. Given such a challenge, I study how the platform can improve social welfare by designing its recommendation policy. In a model with binary product quality and general trial-generat...
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作者：Hancart, Nathan
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：I consider a model of monopoly pricing where a firm makes a price offer to a buyer with reference-dependent preferences without being able to commit to it. The reference point is the ex-ante probability of trade and the buyer exhibits an attachment effect: the higher his expectations to buy, the higher his willingness-to-pay. When the buyer's valuation is private information, a unique equilibrium exists where the firm plays a mixed strategy and its profits are the same as in the reference-inde...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study a remarkable auction used in several fish markets around the world, notably in Honolulu and Sydney, whereby high-quality fish are sold fast through a hybrid auction that combines the Dutch and the English formats in one auction. Speedy sales are of essence for these perishable goods. Our theoretical model incorporating time costs demonstrates that such Honolulu-Sydney auction is preferred by the auctioneer over the Dutch auction when there are few bidders or when bidders have high tim...
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作者：Bommier, Antoine; Fabre, Adrien; Goussebaile, Arnaud; Heyen, Daniel
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Saclay; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; AgroParisTech; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees; Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees; RPTU University Kaiserslautern
摘要：Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may want to be cautious and prefer alternatives that have expert consensus over those that do not. Existing models of decision making under expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notio...
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作者：Ou, Shengliang; Yin, Penghui; Zhang, Donghai; Zhang, Renbin
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Central University of Finance & Economics; National University of Singapore; Shandong University
摘要：Optimal monetary policy has traditionally assigned greater importance to stabilizing prices in sectors with stickier prices, based on multi-sector models assuming full information or exogenous information frictions. This paper challenges the prevailing policy prescription by introducing rational inattention with endogenous information acquisition. Interestingly, the optimal policy assigns a smaller weight to sectors with stickier prices when the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently ...
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作者：Figueroa, Nicolas; Inostroza, Nicolas
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; University of Toronto
摘要：A liquidity-constrained asset owner screens an informed investor using financial securities. Information-insensitive securities reduce the investor's information rents. The optimal screening mechanism consists of a monotone debt menu where more optimistic investor types purchase larger amounts of debt. Interestingly, the issuer may benefit from trading with a better informed investor. For any monotone debt menu, as the asset's cash flows more accurately describe the investor's private informat...
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作者：Bahlali, M.; Boucekkine, R.; Petit, Q.
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We propose a mean-field game (MFG) approach to study the dynamics of spatial agglomeration in a continuous space-time framework where trade across locations may follow a broad class of static gravity models. Forward-looking intertemporal utility-maximizing agents work and migrate in a two-dimensional geography and face idiosyncratic shocks. Equilibrium wages and prices depend on their common distribution and adjust statically according to the underlying trade model. We first prove existence an...
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作者：Isch-Taudien, Remo; Schneider, Fabienne
作者单位：Study Center Gerzensee; University of Bern; Bank of Canada
摘要：We study pseudonymity-an information regime where agents' histories are perfectly observable, but linked only to pseudonyms rather than to true identities. A key feature is that agents may open and use multiple pseudonyms simultaneously. In a tractable environment with limited commitment, we characterize the set of stationary credit equilibria under pseudonymity, showing that it forms a strict non-empty subset of equilibria attainable under a no anonymity regime, where histories are publicly l...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu; Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Yonsei University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In the standard dynamic screening problem between an uninformed seller and a privately informed buyer, theory suggests that the presence (absence) of the buyer's outside option leads to a substantial surplus for the seller (buyer). This outcome arises from contrasting unraveling processes that theory predicts: negative selection occurs in the absence of an outside option, while positive selection occurs in the presence of it. We examine the validity of these contrasting unraveling processes an...
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作者：Carreras, Marc Dordal i; Lee, Seung Joo
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a tradeoff between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabiliz...
