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作者：Duque-Rosas, Eduardo; Pereyra, Juan S.; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universidad de Montevideo; Universidad de Chile
摘要：The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her schoolmates while remaining at the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furth...
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作者：Neuhann, Daniel; Sockin, Michael
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We analyze how public asset purchases affect liquidity, risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing in imperfectly competitive financial markets. Even neutral policies, such as budget-balanced trades of risk-free debt, affect liquidity and trading efficiency. Public debt purchases worsen liquidity and risk sharing by increasing price impact, while debt sales improve risk sharing but distort intertemporal trade. Expansionary quantitative easing policies can thus reduce trading efficiency. We also ...
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作者：Laiho, Tuomas; Salmi, Julia
作者单位：Aalto University; Hanken School of Economics
摘要：We study social learning in markets where a monopolistic seller and potential buyers learn from past buyers' reviews and experiences. Because buyers can wait before purchasing, they have an incentive to free-ride on information from other buyers. The seller has to take this informational externality between buyers into account in her pricing. Our main result is that any Markov perfect equilibrium is inefficient because of too little and too slow sales. This is contrary to the results absent le...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed
作者单位：University of Miami; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：Financial arrangements involving illiquid assets financed by liquid liabilities are often viewed as inherently runnable. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that this is true when risk-sharing arrangements are not optimally designed. Peck and Shell (2003) and Ennis and Keister (2009, 2016), however, demonstrate that runnable banking arrangements can be constrained-efficient when liquidity demand is uncertain and withdrawals must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. We show that this in...
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作者：Sethi, Rajiv; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：A defining feature of culture is similarity in the manner in which information is interpreted. This facilitates extraction of information from the beliefs of those in one's own group, a force for homophily. However, observation of individuals outside one's group deepens our understanding of their culture, counteracting this effect. We model this process, using unobservable, heterogeneous priors (correlated within but not across groups) to represent initial beliefs, and characterize long-run co...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Zhao, Wenbo
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Jinan
摘要：This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (A and B) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer's values of the two objects (vA and vB respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when ...
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作者：Sato, Hiroto; Shimizu, Konan
作者单位：Nagoya University; Keio University
摘要：This study extends Blackwell (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model in which agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce a binary relation over information structures: an information structure is more socially valuable than another if it yields higher expected payoffs for all agents, regardless of their preferences and equilibrium realizations. First, we establish that this binary...
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作者：Mononen, Lasse
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Complexity aversion in choice under risk is well documented. One of its main behavioral effects is the event-splitting effect. It captures how the value of a lottery changes when one prize is split into two prizes, each with half the original probability. We weaken independence and continuity to accommodate the event-splitting effect. The resulting preferences admit either an expected utility representation with an additive entropy cost of complexity or a power-weighted expected utility repres...
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作者：Cheng, Xienan; Borgers, Tilman
作者单位：Peking University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We introduce a theory of dominance that encompasses as special cases the theory of admissible decision procedures in statistics, strict and weak dominance among strategies in games, first or second-order stochastic dominance among monetary lotteries, and Pareto dominance among social alternatives. One choice dominates another if in a variety of situations the former choice yields higher expected utility than the latter. We show that under certain assumptions, which include most importantly con...
