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作者：Heydari, Pedram
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：I provide the first axiomatic characterization of Elimination by Aspects (EBA), a well-known model of stochastic choice originally proposed by Amos Tversky in 1972. The characterization based solely on observable choice behavior and does not assume that the underlying aspects are directly observable-treating them instead as subjective. I also discuss connections between EBA and related models of stochastic choice .
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作者：Choi, Hongseok
作者单位：Sejong University
摘要：This paper investigates whether ambiguity afflicting the long-run rate of growth fades away in a nonexchangeable environment (time-varying instantaneous expected growth rate). Two types of ambiguity are considered: static (multiple priors) and dynamic (multiple laws of motion). In the absence of dynamic ambiguity, likelihood-based learning resolves static ambiguity. In the presence of dynamic ambiguity, on the other hand, likelihood-based learning fails. In this case, static ambiguity fades aw...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Izumi, Ryuichiro; Mattesini, Fabrizio
作者单位：Michigan State University; Wesleyan University; University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：We study how access to wholesale funding affects bank fragility when policymakers can intervene efficiently during a run. In a Diamond-Dybvig environment with a wholesale market, banks can refinance rather than liquidate assets. We show that the effect of wholesale borrowing on fragility depends both on the cost of funds and on the allocation of seniority among creditors. When wholesale lenders are senior, the availability of funds decreases fragility when borrowing is inexpensive; while when ...
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作者：Bianchi, Javier; Bigio, Saki
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study settlement frictions that arise from the need to finance negative balances through an over-the-counter (OTC) market. We derive a closed-form expression for the endogenous convenience yield and show how it can be incorporated into a canonical portfolio problem. Using this framework, we examine how shifts in settlement frictions affect liquidity premia, the volume of overnight funding, the dispersion of market rates, and optimal portfolio allocations. From a normative perspective, we sh...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Gan, Tan; Li, Yingkai
作者单位：Yale University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender's true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Lopez-Moctezuma, Gabriel; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff-relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action mor...
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作者：Krahmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. I show that, unlike in the well-understood case with linear costs, if investment costs are strictly convex, the buyer's equilibrium utility is strictly positive and total welfare is strictly higher than when valuations are public information, thus alleviating t...
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作者：Colombo, Luca V. A.; Femminis, Gianluca; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：How should firms be incentivized to invest efficiently (e.g., in AI or the supply of smart inputs) when such investments come with spillovers and their profitability depends on uncertain aggregate economic conditions? We show that firms can be encouraged to collect information and then use it in society's best interest through a subsidy that resembles a Pigouvian correction but accounts for the non-verifiability of firms' acquisition and usage of information.
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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, Oleg
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is one of the most compelling constructs in mechanism design, but the presence of complementary goods creates the possibility of non-core and even zero-revenue outcomes. In this article, we show that joint feasibility constraints on allocations offer a second pathway to ill-behaved outcomes in the VCG mechanism, even when all bidders have substitutes preferences for the goods. We then develop a theory of complementarities specifically tailored to assig...
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作者：Cheung, Stan; Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：Queen Mary University London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：A Hard Problem is a collective choice problem in which the only feasible alternatives to the status quo consist of a welfare gain to some people (the Winners) and a welfare loss to others (the Losers). These problems are typical in a number of settings, such as climate action, anti-trust regulation, and tax design. We study how to make collective choices when faced with Hard Problems. We find that a relatively weak fairness requirement, which we call Expansion Solidarity, necessarily leads to ...
