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作者:Escude, Matteo
作者单位:Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要:I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties...
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作者:Sun, Xiang; Tang, Qianfeng; Xiao, Mingjun; Zhang, Jun
作者单位:Wuhan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hubei University of Economics; Nanjing Audit University
摘要:Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it-as in the definition of the strong core-and the blocking is credible in t...
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作者:Groh, Carl-Christian
作者单位:University of Bonn
摘要:I study a homogeneous goods' model in which a consumer attains consumption opportunities via sequential search. Whenever a firm is visited by the consumer, the firm observes a private signal about the consumer's valuation and price discriminates based on this information. If the signal is sufficiently precise and search costs are at intermediate levels, an equilibrium in which the consumer visits multiple firms with positive probability emerges. At low search costs, firms offer low prices to d...
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作者:Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig; Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位:University of Mannheim; University of Oxford; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要:In finite problems comprising objects, cases, and an object-and case-contingent payoff function, we study the comparative statics of the set of undominated objects, meaning those for which there exists no mixture over objects that is superior in every case. We consider both weak and strict dominance (corresponding to different degrees of 'strictness' in the definition of superiority). Our main theorem characterises those payoff transformations which robustly expand the not-weakly-dominated and...
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作者:Wu, Jiabin
作者单位:University of Oregon
摘要:This paper studies a multi-trait cultural transmission model with social interactions. The resulting cultural dynamic is equivalent to an evolutionary dynamic on a population game that combines social payoffs and cultural biases. This transformation allows us to apply tools from evolutionary game theory to examine cultural homogeneity and heterogeneity. We show that when social interactions have a coordination nature, cultural biases can push the cultural dynamic toward selecting a culturally ...
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作者:Horner, Johannes; Renault, Jerome
作者单位:Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要:We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.
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作者:Kiguchi, Noriaki; Noguchi, Shinpei; Takahashi, Yuta
作者单位:Tokyo Keizai University; Hitotsubashi University; University of Osaka
摘要:We examine optimal strategy-proof voting mechanisms in environments where the designer lacks precise information about the probability distribution of individual utility profiles. This uncertainty over the true distribution is represented by a set of multiple distributions, and the designer evaluates mechanisms using either the worst-case utility sum or worst-case regret. Departing from the existing literature, we do not assume that utility functions are single-peaked or that the set of possib...
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作者:Sobel, Joel
作者单位:University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:This paper introduces a family of definitions of deceptive behavior. The definitions provide different ways to describe the notion that deceptive behavior misleads a player by inducing inaccurate beliefs. For each definition of deception, I identify a class of preferences under which behavior is deceptive if and only if it harms any player with preferences in the class. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D02; C90; C72. Keywords: communication, damage, deception.
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作者:Koru, Omer Faruk
作者单位:Wesleyan University
摘要:This paper develops a theoretical framework linking automation to the thickness of the top entrepreneurial income distribution, which is approximated by a Pareto distribution. In the model, entrepreneurs face convex labor costs, creating diseconomies of scale. Automation enables them to substitute capital for labor, mitigating the diseconomies and increasing returns to entrepreneurial skill, resulting in a decline in the Pareto parameter and a rise in top entrepreneurial inequality. I test the...
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作者:Meyer-Gohde, Alexander; Tzaawa-Krenzler, Mary
作者单位:Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Oxford
摘要:The Taylor principle, a more than one-for-one reaction of the nominal interest rate to inflation, is a central tenet of monetary policy to rule out self-fulfilling equilibria. The standard sticky-price model only holds this principle as a sufficient determinacy bound, with substitutes such as output-gap targeting available. We show that if the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, the Taylor principle is necessary and no amount of output-gap, output-growth, or forecast targeting can substitute ...