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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Kos, Nenad
作者单位：Emory University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study design and pricing by a monopolist who has no information about the distribution of consumers' tastes and maximizes her profit under the worst-case scenario. We show that her optimal strategy takes a simple form of dividing the taste space into a finite number of equal-length intervals and serving consumers on a randomly chosen interval. We obtain this result by studying the dual problem of finding a distribution of consumers' tastes that minimizes the seller's profit and establishing...
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作者：Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Osaka; SKEMA Business School; Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We study optimal auctions with expectation-based loss-averse bidders. For ex-ante identical bidders, we establish sufficient conditions under which optimal mechanisms must be asymmetric. While symmetric designs are optimal for bidders with expected-utility preferences, we show that if the degree of loss aversion is sufficiently large relative to valuation variation, a one-bidder optimal design (an extreme form of asymmetry) yields higher expected revenue than any symmetric design with multiple...
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作者：Albrecht, Brian C.; Phelan, Thomas; Pretnar, Nick
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We enrich standard models of imperfect competition by allowing consumer demand for market goods to depend non-separably on off-market time. Consumers value final consumption experiences that require both market purchases and time, which reshapes demand elasticities through two opposing forces. First, because time is an input, changes in market prices translate only partially into changes in the cost of an experience and second, households can substitute time for market purchases in response to...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Leo, Greg
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Loyola Marymount University
摘要：Given a model of preferences, what choice data or experiment is sufficient to definitively test whether a subject is consistent with the model or to classify them into some type within the model? We characterize all experiments that test or classify a given model using a novel graph-theoretic construction: the labeled permutohedron. We show how these results can be used to identify the smallest experiments that achieve a particular goal.
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作者：Biswas, Sonny; Koufopoulos, Kostas; Nguyen, Thi Mai
作者单位：University of Reading; University of Sussex; University of York - UK
摘要：We reconsider the incomplete contracting framework of Mitkov (2024) in which an entrepreneur seeks funding for a project and can privately choose its type. Renegotiation is permitted at an intermediate date. We characterize the conditions under which pay-for-failure is necessary to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the value-maximizing innovative project. When pay-for-failure is necessary, we generalize Mitkov (2024)'s results by showing that callable long-term debt can replicate the s...
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作者：Chang, Hung-Chi; Li, Yiting
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University
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作者：Sadler, Evan
摘要：Despite addressing similar underlying questions, the literatures on network formation and matching have evolved more or less independently. This paper offers a common framework, studying a general model of network formation without externalities-equivalently, a one-sided many-to-many matching model. I give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of stable graphs, I prove a rural hospital theorem, and I highlight a link-by-link conflict of interest across different stable graphs. Special ca...
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作者：Chen, Heng; Liu, Yicheng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：In this paper, we characterize a forecasting model where forecasters cannot perfectly distinguish between the two persistent components (trends and cycles) in a dynamic setting. In this model, forecasters jointly update their beliefs about the two components: noisy information about one component is used to update beliefs about the other component. We present diagnostic empirical facts on forecasting behaviors and show that these facts are consistent with our model's predictions while contradi...
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作者：Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to accept a project by designing a quality test. Testing is imperfectly reliable and produces evidence only with some probability. If the sender obtains the evidence, she can choose to disclose it or pretend not to have obtained it. When reliability is low, in equilibrium the sender chooses a pass/fail test that reveals only whether the quality is above or below a threshold. The pass/fail threshold is decreasing in reliability. If the sender ...
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作者：Brown, Alexander L.; Guo, Huiyi; Je, Hyundam
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Seoul
摘要：Generalized recursive utility models often imply that agents have a preference over the timing of uncertainty resolution. Laboratory elicitations of subjects' preferences generally provide direct evidence in support of this implication, but only in the domain of risk. We provide the first experimental examination of uncertainty resolution with respect to ambiguity, in addition to risk. The modal subject exhibits a preference for both early resolution of risk and ambiguity, but with only a mini...
