The quasi-prekernel for cooperative games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kong, Qianqian; Peters, Hans; Sun, Hao
• 署名单位: Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics; Maastricht University; Northwestern Polytechnical University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.009
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: REACTIVE BARGAINING SET; POWER; EXISTENCE; Nucleolus; THEOREM; kernel

摘要

The quasi-prekernel is a novel solution concept for cooperative games. It is a refinement of existing prebargaining set solutions, notably the reactive, semireactive, and Aumann-Davis-Maschler prebargaining sets. It contains the prekernel, and coincides with that solution on simple games except possibly on balanced simple games with all individual worths equal to zero. An axiomatic characterization based on reduced game properties is provided. The steady version, obtained by putting conditions on objecting and counterobjecting coalitions, is considered as well. Finally, by considering objecting and counterobjecting coalitions independent of specific players, the socalled excess prebargaining obtains, which is another novel solution concept.