Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calleja, Pedro; Llerena, Francesc
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.011
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: bankruptcy problem; proportional rule; contagion; RISK

摘要

In this paper, we explore the issue of manipulability in the setting of financial systems by considering two weak forms of immunity: merging-proofness and splitting-proofness. Not surprisingly, splitting-proofness conflicts with basic requirements such as the priority of debt over equity and the limited liability of equity. Remarkably, we provide a comprehensive characterization of the class of bankruptcy rules that gives rise to financial rules that satisfy merging-proofness.