Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gui, Shan; Houser, Daniel
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.009
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Auctions; DESIGN

摘要

We study dynamic mechanism design in non-clairvoyant environments, where sellers cannot forecast future demand and buyers hold private information. Using two laboratory experiments, we evaluate two non-clairvoyant mechanisms: the dynamic maximin-optimal non-clairvoyant mechanism (DM, Mirrokni et al., 2020) and the repeated static optimal mechanism (RS, Myerson, 1981). Experiment 1 compares DM and RS between demand-distribution scenarios and shows that non-clairvoyant mechanisms perform as intended: DM either outperforms or underperforms RS depending on the scenario, consistent with theory. Building on these results, Experiment 2 examines the optimal clairvoyant mechanism (OC) and a different implementation of DM. In surprising contrast to theory, OC using full information performs no better than the non-clairvoyant mechanisms, while DM performs equally well across implementation forms. Our results highlight the practical importance of non-clairvoyant mechanisms as implementable approaches to dynamic auction design in uncertain markets.