Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga
• 署名单位: University of Milano-Bicocca
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: POWER

摘要

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, Mwinning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.