The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of rational behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Velez, Rodrigo A.; Brown, Alexander L.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Auctions

摘要

This paper introduces a refinement of Nash equilibrium (NE) to determine the relevance of weakly dominated NE in games. We adapt Harsanyi (1973)'s concept of approachability, originally based on games with randomly disturbed payoffs, and extend it to a broader family that encompasses the most widely used equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior. We identify a singular NE refinement, approximate payoff monotone equilibrium (APME), that coincides with the set of NE that are approachable by regular quantal response equilibria as well as control cost models. We advocate for APME based on its 1) foundation in models that rationalize empirically observed behavior; 2) ability to discriminate between equilibria without automatically discarding weakly dominated behavior; and 3) computational simplicity in applications where the structure of NE is known. We illustrate the value of APME in three applications in which empirical studies suggest that weakly dominated NE are relevant.