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作者：Cumbul, Eray
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games an...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We experimentally investigate how impartial observers allocate money to agents whose complernentarity and substitutability determine the surplus that each group can achieve. Analyzing the data through the lens of axioms and solutions from cooperative game theory, a one-parameter model (mixing equal split and Shapley value) arises as a parsimonious description of the data.
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Schneider, Frederic
作者单位：Yale University; University of Birmingham
摘要：Using a large-scale hybrid laboratory and online trust experiment with and without preplay communication, we investigate how the passage of time affects trust. Communication (predominantly through promises) raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. This result holds even when three weeks pass between the time of the trustee's message/the trustor's decision to trust and the time of the trustee's contribution choice and even when this contribution choice is made outside...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Florence
摘要：We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling may be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfa...
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作者：Hansen, Emanuel
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on politi-cal platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter mode...
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作者：Fong, Yuk-fai; Liu, Ting; Meng, Xiaoxuan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We study trust building in credence-goods markets in a dynamic setting. When consumers' expected loss is low and it is efficient to fix only the more severe problem, there is no trade in the one-shot game. In the repeated game, an expert's honesty is monitored through consumers' rejection of his recommendations. The expert's profit in the optimal equilibrium weakly increases in the discount factor but does not achieve the first best, which contrasts sharply with the optimal equilibrium in expe...
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作者：Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn
摘要：We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a left-right axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting pro-cess, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophi...
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作者：Libgober, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：I develop a theoretical model of costly information acquisition in order to evaluate transparency requirements in empirical research. A sender chooses an experiment characterized by multiple dimensions, while a receiver observes the experiment's outcome (though not necessarily all dimensions). I show that the receiver may prefer to keep dimensions hidden, even those contributing to bias, despite preferring more informative experiments. This can occur if the perception of bias is lessened when ...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen; Kuvalekar, Aditya
作者单位：McMaster University; University of Essex
摘要：We study relational contracts between a firm and a worker with mutual uncertainty about match quality. The worker's actions are publicly observed and generate both output and information about the match quality. We show that the relational contracts may be inefficient. We characterize the inefficiency through a holdup problem on the contemporaneous output. In the frequent action limit, these inefficiencies persist if and only if information degrades at least at the same rate at which impatienc...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Miller, David A.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incen-tive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. A...
