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作者：Diasakos, Theodoros M.; Gerasimou, Georgios
作者单位：University of Stirling; University of St Andrews
摘要：It is frequently assumed in several domains of economics that demand functions are invertible in prices. At the primitive level of preferences, however, the corresponding characterization has remained elusive. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on a utility-maximizing consumer's preferences for her demand function to be continuous and invertible: strict convexity, strict monotonicity, and differentiability in the sense of Rubinstein (2006). We further show that Rubinstein differen...
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Hahn, Niklas; Hoefer, Martin; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Ariel University; Goethe University Frankfurt; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's prefer-ences and, in particular, cannot d...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro; Zhu, Shuguang
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about the agent's belief. Although ex post incentive-compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any knowledge about the agent's belief, we show that, under a certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists a non-EPIC mecha-nism that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than any EPIC mechanism given whatever (admissible) belief struc...
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作者：Bac, Mehmet
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：How should law enforcement resources be allocated to minimize the harms from flexible, chain-form trafficking organizations? I show that optimal interventions focus on one target, the feeding source (decap-itation) or the revenue-generating tail (amputation). Decapitation dismantles the crime chain under large budgets but induces maxi-mal expansion otherwise, whereas amputation generates a rich set of detection outcomes and limits the chain's size response. A rule of thumb emerges for authorit...
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作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than is optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges mo...
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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates' and voters' policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters' threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters' bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is str...
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作者：Nagy, David Krisztian
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：I study how trade affects urbanization and real income. To this end, I exploit large-scale exogenous changes in trade stemming from the redrawing of Hungary's borders after the First World War. I show that urbanization in counties near the new border decreased significantly relative to counties farther away. I rationalize this reduced-form finding in a spatial model in which benefits from trading drive agglomeration around locations where trading activity takes place. Structurally estimating t...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We develop a tractable, dynamic, and strategic model of many-to-many matching with payoff externalities across links. The joint dynamic surplus or certain second properties of individual utilities, like pay-off externalities, can typically be identified. We characterize a class of interior equilibria as solutions to an optimization problem with an objective function that consists of welfare minus an inefficiency loss term. In equilibrium, too few matches are formed. We compare trans-ferable an...
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作者：Schiffer, Burkhard C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could learn itself Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is kno...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Basel
摘要：We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequen...
