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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Howard, Greg
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper provides evidence of rational inattention by experienced professionals in strategic interactions. We add rational inattention to a game of matching pennies with state-dependent payoffs. Unlike the full-information, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, payoffs of different actions need not be equated state by state. Moreover, players respond partially to payoff differences, this responsiveness is stronger when attention costs are lower, strategies converge to full-information Nash as sta...
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作者：Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：University of Bologna; Tilburg University
摘要：Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequen-tial play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with inter-mediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooper-ation rate by arou...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan; Romagnoli, Giorgia
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Universidad de Montevideo; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Elicitation mechanisms typically presume only money enters utility functions. However, nonmonetary objectives are confounders. In particular, psychologists argue people favor bets where ability is involved over equivalent random bets-a preference for control. Our new elicitation method mitigates control objectives and determines that under the widely used matching probabilities method, subjects report beliefs 18 percent higher than their true beliefs to increase control. Nonmonetary objectives...
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作者：Vasquez, Jorge
作者单位：Smith College
摘要：This paper develops a theory of crime in which potential victims elect their vigilance levels. When vigilance expenses are greater than expected property losses, an increase in penalties raises crime, namely, a criminal Laffer curve emerges. This curve is higher and peaks earlier when victims face higher costs. Thus, the government may wish to subsidize vigilance rather than increase penalties. Indeed, an increase in penalties may shift the vigilance levels further away from their socially opt...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Olckers, Matthew
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Monash University
摘要：We analyze the design of a mechanism to extract a ranking of individuals according to a unidimensional characteristic, such as ability or need. Individuals, connected on a social network, only have local information about the ranking. We show that a planner can construct an ex post incentive compatible and efficient mechanism if and only if every pair of friends has a friend in common. We characterize the windmill network as the sparsest social network for which the planner can always construc...
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作者：Martinelli, Cesar
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment in which politicians may take bribes at different stages of their careers and in which politicians'actions are only imper-fectly observed by voters. We show that the expectation of promotion to higher office may motivate some politicians to behave worse at the latest stages of their careers, setting off a trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior at lower levels of office and selecting better ...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Li, Zhuozheng; Zhang, Tianle
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Lingnan University
摘要：We introduce a search model where products differ in horizontal attributes and unobserved quality (experience goods), and firms can establish quality reputation. We show that the inability of consumers to observe quality before purchase significantly changes how search frictions affect market performance. In equilibrium, higher search costs reduce match values and increase price but can boost firms' investment in product quality. Under plausible conditions, both consumer and total welfare init...
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作者：Board, Simon; Meyer-ter-vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study the life cycle of a firm that produces a good of unknown quality. The firm manages its quality by investing while consumers learn via public breakthroughs; if the firm fails to generate such breakthroughs, its revenue falls and it eventually exits. Optimal investment depends on the firm???s reputation (the market???s belief about its quality) and self-esteem (the firm???s own belief about its quality), and is single-peaked in the time since a breakthrough. We derive predictions about ...
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作者：Teh, Tat-How; Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We explore the implications of steering by an informed profit-maximizing intermediary. The intermediary steers consumers by recommending firms, taking into account both the commissions firms offer and the prices they set. Such steering results in higher commissions and consumer prices, so that consumers only benefit from intermediation when their search cost is sufficiently high. Steering reverses the normal relationship between competition and price, with prices increasing in the number of co...
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作者：Chao, Yong; Tan, Guofu; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：University of Louisville; University of Southern California; Lingnan University
摘要：We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm competing with a minor firm. The dominant firm offers a general tariff first, and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by a buyer choosing her purchases. By developing a mechanism-design approach to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. In equilibrium the dominant firm uses a cont...
