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作者：Friedman, Evan
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal-form games in which players best respond to noisy belief realizations. Axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents' behavior. The axioms impose testable restrictions both within and across games, and we compare these restrictions to those of regular quantal response equi-librium (QRE) in which axioms are placed on the quantal response function as the primitive. NBE can gene...
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作者：Bezin, Emeline; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Monash University
摘要：We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the family structure and the decision to commit crime are endog-enous and the dynamics of moral norms of good conduct is trans-mitted intergenerationally by families and peers. By destroying biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire because it increases the possi-bility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Our model also explains the emergence and pe...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Euud
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening pro-cesses. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies, we show that addi-tional binary noise can potentially improve a screening, an effect that resembles a lucky coin toss. We compare different noisy sig-nals under threshold strategies and optimal ones, and we provide several characterizations of ca...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We show that the treatment effect estimated by standard methods such as regression discontinuity analysis or difference-in-differences may contain a transient ???learning effect??? that is entangled with the long-term effect of the treatment. This learning effect occurs when the variable of interest is the agents???efforts, when treatment and con-trol correspond to success or failure: success or failure gives agents information about how much their effort matters, and consequently changes the ...
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作者：Mercadal, Ignacia
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I study the effects of financial players who trade alongside physical buyers and sellers in electricity markets. Using detailed firm-level data, I examine physical and financial firrns' responses to regulation that exogenously increased financial trading. I show that the effect of speculators on generators' market power depends on the kind of equilibrium they are in. I develop a test of the null of static Nash equilibrium and reject it. To implement the test, I present a new method to define m...
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作者：Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：Chung, Glimcher, and Tymula (2019) observed both consumers' choices over commodity bundles and choices under risk. They assumed a cardinal riskless utility function V representing consumer choices and a cardinal risky utility function U. The two were inconsistent. This note shows that the two functions can be reconciled if we assume that V is ordinal. Then one utility function U can accommodate both risky and riskless choices.
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作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider the question of how best to allocate enforcement resources across different locations with the goal of deterring unwanted behavior. We rely on Bayesian persuasion to improve deterrence. We focus on the case where agents care only about the expected amount of enforcement resources given messages received. Optimization in the space of induced mean posterior beliefs involves a partial convexification of the objective function. We describe inter-pretable conditions under which it is po...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A monopolistic firm observes a signal about the state of the world and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an uninformed consumer who has recourse to some outside option. We provide a geometric characterization of the firm's information structure that maximizes the consumer's surplus: the optimal regime partitions the space of payoff states into polyhedral cones with disjoint interiors. We inter-pret our results in terms of the maximization of the consumer's pri-vacy rent. We illustrate ...
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作者：Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Sydney
摘要：Workhorse economic models used for studying the market impacts of search frictions assume constant search costs: individuals pay the same cost to obtain price information each time they search. This paper provides evidence on a new form of search costs: start-up costs. Exploiting a natural experiment in retail gasoline, we document how a temporary, large exogenous shock to consumers' search incentives leads to a substantial, permanent increase in price search. A standard search model fails to ...
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作者：Demuynck, Thomas; Seel, Christian; Tran, Giang
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Maastricht University
摘要：We develop an index of competitiveness and cooperativeness that is based on the primitives of a normal-form game, i.e., players, strate-gies and payoffs. The index relies on the unique decomposition of a given game into a zero-sum game and a common interest game. The index decreases in the distance to its zero-sum part and increases in the distance to its common interest part. The comparative statics of our index coincide with economic intuition. The index also supports experimental findings i...
