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作者：Migrow, Dmitri; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study the interaction between productive investment and per-suasion activities in a principal???agent setting with strategic dis-closure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even though productive activities are more efficient and raise the chances of success in persuasion. The equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential allocation procedures are the same, because the v...
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作者：Teh, Tat-How
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：Platforms that intermediate trades-such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay-play a regulatory role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to analyze a platform's nonprice governance design and its incentive to act in a welfare-enhancing manner. We show that the platform's governance design can be distorted toward inducing insufficient or excessive seller competition, depending on the nature of the fee instrument employed by the platform. These results are illust...
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作者：Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Stanford University; Boston University
摘要：We construct a model of collective search in which players gradually approach the Pareto frontier. The players have imperfect control over which improvements to the status quo will be considered. Inefficiency takes place due to the difficulty in finding improvements acceptable to both parties. The process is path dependent, with early agreements determining long-run outcomes. It may also be cyclical, as players alternate between being more and less accommodating.
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作者：Ghani, Tarek; Reed, Tristan
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); The World Bank
摘要：Firms use relational contracts to support repeated trade. Do these informal agreements evolve in response to market conditions? In a market for ice, firms reestablish relationships on new terms when a prior agreement breaks down. Using transaction data, we show that ice retailers prioritize deliveries to loyal buyers-fishing firms when supply from the monopolistic manufacturer is scarce. After an upstream shock to competition increases supply, repeated trade lapses, threatening retailers' posi...
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作者：Friberg, Richard; Steen, Frode; Ulsaker, Simen A.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper examines the effect of cross-border shopping on grocery demand in Norway using monthly store x category sales data from Norway's largest grocery chain 2012-2016. The sensitivity of demand to the foreign price is hump-shaped and greatest 30-60 minutes' driving distance from the closest foreign store. Combining continuous demand, fixed costs of cross-border shopping, and linear transport costs a la Hotelling, we show how this hump shape can arise through a combination of intensive and...
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作者：Denter, Philipp; Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We analyze the incentives for showing off , which we model as a costly signaling game , and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest , a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium , costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results r...
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作者：Dreyfuss, Bnaya; Heffetz, Ori; Rabin, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Deferred acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that-in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments -par-ticipants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show the-oretically why, with expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyz...
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作者：Thiel, Jurre H.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：To prevent biased advice, regulators increasingly ban commission payments to financial advisers. Such bans are associated with advice gaps, meaning that advice becomes less accessible. To understand the trade-off between the quality and accessibility of advice, this paper develops a model of price competition in advice markets with endogenous entry of advisers. While commission bans increase consumer surplus in the short run, they hurt the profitability of advisers. In the long run, advisers e...
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作者：Kim, Jeongbin; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Zeidel, Jeffrey R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are st...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We explore the optimal policy for disclosing con-testants' interim status after the preliminary round, i.e., their interim ranking and elimination decision. The optimum depends on the design objective. We fully characterize the conditions under which disclo-sure or concealment emerges as the optimum. We further allow the organizer to bias the competition based on finalists' interim rankings, which endogen...
